Til death us do part: joint tenancy as property by Galloway, Kate
Monday 7 July 3.30pm to 4.30pm 
The Contemporary Reality of Realty 
Associate Professor Matthew Storey 
Charles Darwin University 
Abstract 
The paper considers the contemporary distinction between those classes of property identified as 
realty and those classes of property identified as personalty. Commencing by briefly recounting the 
historical basis of the distinction the paper moves to identify the distinctions between realty and 
personalty that are most usually identified: access to remedies; forms of succession; and, application 
of the doctrine of tenure. The paper identifies first that the distinctions are consequential of 
classification rather than determinative. Second though, the paper suggests that as a result of 
centuries old statutory intervention and the development of Equity, the fundamental contemporary 
distinction between realty and personalty lies in the application of the doctrine of tenure to realty. 
At this point the paper moves to consider in some detail contemporary formulation of the doctrine of 
tenure and the notion of the radical title of the Crown. Examining Australian authority subsequent to 
Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, various crown land and land titles legislation the paper 
concludes that the contemporary radical title of the Crown amounts to an ability to grant an interest in 
land the subject of radical title. Thus formulated, the paper contrasts radical title with the Crown's 
"property" in fauna identified by the majority of the High Court in Yanner v Eaton (1999) 73 ALJR 1518 
at 1525 being" ... the aggregate of the various rights of control by the Executive ... ". 
The paper concludes by suggesting that there is no practical contemporary distinction between the 
"aggregate of rights to control" and radical title and that this conclusion suggests a merging of realty 
and personalty. The paper ends though by noting that the theoretical conclusion reached cannot alter 
the weight of history in applying consequential distinctions to classes of property that greatly influence 
their contemporary reality. 
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Abstract 
What is the true nature and extent of the interest of the joint tenant, as distinct from their joint interest 
in the property itself? Can the joint tenancy itself constitute property? And, will the extent of a joint 
tenant's interest always be an undivided moiety? This paper reviews two recent decisions: Peldan v 
Anderson (2006) 80 ALJR 1588 and Cummins v Cummins [2006] HCA 7. At first instance, the court in 
Peldan v Anderson conceptualised the severance of a joint tenancy as a transfer of property. This 
was discussed also in the Federal Court decision and in the High Court on appeal. The Federal Court 
analysed the severance of a joint tenancy in terms of the alienation of a bundle of rights, indicating an 
understanding of a joint tenancy as itself a property interest. This paper uses Penner's challenge to 
the 'bundle of rights' theory of property as a framework to reject this. Having determined the nature of 
a joint tenancy as other than property, the paper refers to Cummins to examine the extent of the joint 
tenant's property interest. This case shows a contemporary application of equitable rules that result in 
the deconstruction of the joint tenant's undivided moiety. Together, these cases highlight the 
challenges associated with finding the true extent of 'ownership' and 'property' where a joint tenancy is 
involved. 
